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The Sources and Sustainability of
China’s Economic Growth
IN 1978, AT THE outset of its economic reform, China was the world’s tenth-
largest economy, with a GDP of about $150 billion, or less than 6 percent of
U.S. GDP at the time. By 2005, however, China’s economy, at $2.2 trillion,
had grown to become the fourth largest in the world, behind only the United
States at $12.5 trillion, Japan at $4.5 trillion, and Germany at $2.8 trillion.
The above figures, which come from the World Bank, evaluate GDP at
current exchange rates and do not take account of differences in the pur-
chasing power of currencies. When measured instead at purchasing power
parity (PPP), China is already the world’s second-largest economy, with
almost $9 trillion in output, nearly three quarters that of the United States.
It has been suggested that, at current growth rates, China’s GDP stated in
PPP terms could exceed that of the United States as early as 2010.
1
When China’s GDP converted at current exchange rates does match that
of the United States, assuming that China’s population remains four times
the U.S. population, Chinese income per capita will then be but one quar-
ter that of the United States. By comparison, the purchasing power of the
average Chinese resident will substantially exceed one quarter that of the
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for China’s GDP to match and ultimately surpass that of the United
States? Today even China’s coastal industry, the country’s most techno-
logically advanced region and sector, lags substantially behind the world
technology frontier. Meanwhile a well-known feature of China’s rapid
economic transformation is the unequal advance, in terms of technolog-
ical change and productivity, of different regions and sectors across this
large and populous country. The regions and sectors that lag behind
China’s coastal industry also exhibit large disparities in productivity
among themselves.
These large international and internal productivity gaps represent both
advantages and disadvantages for China’s ability to sustain high rates of
GDP growth. The key advantage is that both the international gap and
the internal gaps continue to provide multiple channels through which
catch-up can proceed. A well-known disadvantage of the internal gaps is
that the accompanying large differences in income threaten social stabil-
ity. A further disadvantage of large internal productivity differences, to the
extent they prove persistent, is that much of the burden of China’s catch-up
with the United States will fall on coastal industry. That is, if productivi-
ties in the regions and sectors outside China’s coastal industry remain far
below one quarter that of the United States, then coastal industry will have
to achieve productivity levels well above one quarter that of the United
States. Coastal industry will have to continue as the locomotive pulling
the rest of the economy forward. Indeed, if China is to meet its ambitious
goal of output parity with the United States, productivity in coastal indus-
try may have to closely approach or even exceed U.S. productivity. Yet the
history of other successful developing countries suggests that, as it does so,
China’s productivity growth is likely to slow substantially, in turn slowing
the country’s overall economic growth.
A number of questions emerge from this overview and frame the analy-
sis in this paper: Within China, how much does China’s coastal industry
lag behind the global frontier? How much do China’s other regions and
sectors lag behind coastal industry? Is there evidence of catch-up or con-
vergence of these regions and sectors with coastal industry? If so, what are
the sources of such change? If instead there are growing disparities, what
are the causes? To what extent can one expect that, as China’s coastal
industry closes in on the global technology frontier, the productivity growth
of China’s own technology frontier will slow?
2 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2006
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level data. However, any research agenda that seeks to assess a country’s
medium- to long-term economic growth prospects has to take into account
that country’s capacity for institutional adaptation, since institutions shape
the incentives and prospects for such growth. This is particularly true for
China, which remains engaged in two transitions simultaneously: from a
centrally planned to a market economy, and from a less to a more devel-
oped country. Therefore we also speculate as to what institutional reforms
will most directly bear on China’s ability to close its international and
internal productivity gaps. These reforms depend on the ability of China’s
political system to formulate and enforce the rules that reassign and clar-
ify the property rights needed to sustain investment in technology devel-
opment and to facilitate the ﬂow of resources to the regions and sectors
offering high returns.
During the past quarter century of reform, and largely to the surprise
of most observers, China’s economic performance has demonstrated con-
siderable resilience. In addition to successfully weathering the Asian
ﬁnancial crises of the late 1990s, China has substantially restructured its
state enterprise sector and opened itself to the international economy,
including by having adopted World Trade Organization (WTO) rules.
For two decades now China has sustained an annual average rate of growth
of GDP about 6 percentage points higher than that of the United States
(about 9 percent versus 3 percent). If China can sustain that growth
advantage into the future, then, assuming no change in exchange rates,
its GDP unadjusted for PPP will catch up to that of the United States in
twenty-ﬁve to thirty years.
When China’s GDP does catch up to U.S. GDP, that fact will be of
more than symbolic importance. Having established an economic system
that is as large, if not as efficient, as that of the United States, China’s
consumption of natural resources, its participation in the international
trading and financial systems, its contribution to global technological
advance, and its influence in international relations and conflict man-
agement are likely to approach and in some cases exceed those of the
United States.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the
basic model, partly inspired by Edward Denison’s work, that we use to
organize our analysis of China’s catch-up prospects. We next examine the
magnitude of the relevant productivity gaps, and we focus on the Chinese
Gary H. Jefferson, Albert G. Z. Hu, and Jian Su 3
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and the internal gaps. We then combine our empirical ﬁndings to discuss
the prospects and challenges for China’s GDP to catch up with that of the
United States during the next twenty-ﬁve to thirty years. As already sug-
gested, any analysis of China’s catch-up prospects over such a horizon
must take into account the role of institutions, including both the con-
straints they set and the opportunities they offer for shaping the pace at
which the relevant productivity gaps are reduced. Finally, we focus on the
political economy of China’s economic growth, and we draw various con-
clusions from our analysis, including some policy implications.
The Basic Model: Two Productivity Gaps
In his study of the process by which living standards in the major non-
U.S. industrial economies narrowed the gap with, and ultimately caught up
to, those in the United States, Denison identiﬁed several sources of this
catch-up, three of which he viewed as key: resource reallocation, scale
economies, and movement toward the international technological frontier
(table 1).
2 In his study of China’s long-run performance, Angus Maddison
cites these same three sources of long-run growth:
Countries in this situation of relative backwardness and distance from the
technological frontier have a capacity for fast growth if they mobilise and
allocate physical and human capital effectively, adapt foreign technology to
their factor proportions and utilise the opportunities for specialisation which
come from integration into the world economy.
3
A close examination of Denison’s results suggests the following lessons:
—Within the current group of advanced industrial countries (members
of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, or
OECD), labor productivity in the initially poorer countries grew faster than
it did in the richer countries—a necessary condition for catch-up.
—Some labor productivity growth originated with capital accumulation
(capital deepening), but for the lower-income economies the most impor-
tant source of catch-up was growth in total factor productivity (TFP).
4 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2006
2. Denison (1967).
3. Maddison (1998, p. 17).





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































10269-01_Jefferson-rev.qxd  1/29/07  10:56 AM  Page 5—Among the sources of TFP growth, the creation of scale economies
and resource reallocation were most important to the catch-up process.
Movement toward the international technology frontier was less important
for the group as a whole.
Although, statistically, the results in table 1 conﬁrm the relative unim-
portance of movement toward the international frontier, arguably it is this
factor that drives the other two. That is, without the continuous movement
of the advanced industrial sector of a developing economy toward the
international frontier, the potential gains from internal resource realloca-
tion will eventually be exhausted. Furthermore, establishing scale economies
depends substantially on acquiring state-of-the-art technologies that embody
the potential to scale up. The international technology frontier is indeed
synonymous with innovations that exploit scale economies.
Drawing on Denison’s analytical perspective, one can think of China’s
growth trajectory as being driven by the ongoing reduction of two pro-
ductivity gaps. The ﬁrst is the international productivity gap, which reﬂects
the substantial distance between the international technology frontier and
China’s technology frontier, which we define as the productivity of Chi-
nese industry or, more speciﬁcally, as the productivity of industry in China’s
leading coastal areas. The second is the internal productivity disparity
between China’s coastal industrial sector and the country’s lagging agricul-
tural and services sectors and between coastal industry and the industrial sec-
tors of China’s other regions. Of course, the two gaps are not unrelated.
Absent an equivalent increase in the productivity of the lagging sectors, as
productivity growth in China’s advanced industrial sector reduces the inter-
national productivity gap, it simultaneously must increase the internal pro-
ductivity gap, creating the potential for growth through internal technology
diffusion and factor reallocation.
The catch-up of China’s advanced industrial sector toward the world
frontier is fundamentally driven by technological advance, which in turn
is driven by the integration of China’s industrial economy with the world
economy. This integration has been accelerating, spurred by China’s
accession to the WTO in 2001, the surge of foreign direct investment
(FDI) into China during the past decade, and the rapid intensiﬁcation of
R&D spending, which facilitates the acquisition and diffusion of tech-
nology. Rapid movement of China’s industrial economy toward the inter-
national frontier has been the driver of China’s sustained rapid GDP
6 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2006
10269-01_Jefferson-rev.qxd  1/29/07  10:56 AM  Page 6growth. Although labor productivity in China’s advanced industrial sector
leads that of other regions and other sectors, in 2002 it was still less than
one quarter that in the United States. Thus, even if China’s entire labor
force and capital stock were to be efﬁciently reallocated and were per-
forming at the current level of the country’s advanced industrial sector,
China’s GDP would still be smaller than U.S. GDP.
However, productivity differences across China’s regions and sectors
have not diminished during the reform period; indeed, ample evidence
suggests that they have widened. China’s catch-up thus will require not
only the reallocation of labor and capital to the advanced sectors, but
also the diffusion of productivity-enhancing technology in the other
direction, to the backward sectors. Several institutional reforms will be
needed to support the restructuring and upgrading of the backward
regions and sectors, including land ownership reform, reductions in imped-
iments to labor mobility and interregional trade, banking and corporate
governance reform, and laws governing antitrust, bankruptcy, and mergers
and acquisitions. (We examine the functions and political economy of
these institutional requirements later in the paper.) If levels of produc-
tivity across regions and sectors within China do not converge, China’s
coastal industry will bear the burden of catch-up, which will make that
catch-up more difﬁcult given the tendency for productivity growth in a
developing country to slow as its industrial productivity frontier approaches
the world productivity frontier.
Measuring the Productivity Gaps: A First Look
We attempt here to assess the magnitude of China’s international and
internal productivity gaps. With respect to the latter, we examine in some
detail the gaps in labor productivity between industry and agriculture, and
between industry and services, both across China and within each of its
four major regions. We report ﬁndings using both unadjusted employment
data from China’s National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) and data that
correct for a possible overcounting of employment in agriculture and
undercounting in the other sectors. Finally, we extend the analysis beyond
labor productivity to capital and total factor productivity.
Gary H. Jefferson, Albert G. Z. Hu, and Jian Su 7
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Figure 1 illustrates labor productivity differentials for twenty-seven
manufacturing industries at the two-digit standard classification level.4
The figure shows productivity gaps between China’s industries and the
international frontier industries, defined as the corresponding industry in
the United States or Japan, whichever of the two had the higher labor
productivity.
5 Comparisons are made for 1995 and 2002, for industry in
each of China’s four major regions: coastal, northeastern, central, and
western.
6 Since the Chinese provincial data are based on a subset of the
firm-level data from the large and medium-size enterprise (LME) data
set of China’s NBS (thus omitting presumably less efficient small firms),
we anticipate some upward bias favoring China in these comparisons.
On average for the twenty-seven industries, industrial labor productivity
in the coastal region in 2002 was just one quarter that of the international
frontier. However, this difference represents a substantial gain compared
with 1995, when labor productivity at the world frontier was nine times
that of the coast. The figure shows that during this seven-year period,
within the coastal region, all but four of the twenty-six industries with
available data exhibited catch-up.
7
One industry that stands out in figure 1 is the food, beverage, and
tobacco industry (5), where the rate of catch-up in 2002 seems substan-
tially faster than in China’s other industries. A key reason for this dis-
parity is the existence of extremely high proﬁts in the tobacco industry:
20.6 percent of total industrial costs in 2002 compared with an overall
8 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2006
4. The industry productivity data for the United States and Japan are from the Groningen
Growth and Development Centre, University of Groningen, The Netherlands (www.ggdc.net/
dseries/60-industry.shtml); the industry data for the thirty-one Chinese provinces, autonomous
areas, and municipalities are based on ﬁrm-level data from the large and medium-size enter-
prise data set compiled by China’s NBS.
5. Among the twenty-seven industries, in 2002 the U.S. industry represented the fron-
tier in seventeen, and the Japanese industry in the remaining ten.
6. The coastal provinces and autonomous municipalities (hereafter referred to simply
as “provinces”) are Beijing, Fujian, Guangdong, Hainan, Jiangsu, Shandong, Shanghai,
Tianjin, and Zhejiang; the northeastern provinces are Heilongjiang, Jilin, and Liaoning; the
central provinces are Anhui, Guangxi, Hebei, Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Inner Mongolia,
Jiangxi, and Shanxi; and the western provinces are Chongqing, Gansu, Guizhou, Ningxia,
Qinghai, Shaanxi, Sichuan, Xinjiang, Xizang, and Yunan.
7. For four of the twenty-seven industries—ofﬁce machinery (19), insulated wire (20),
radio and television receivers (24), and airplanes and spacecraft (29)—data are unavailable
for at least one of the four regions.
10269-01_Jefferson-rev.qxd  1/29/07  10:56 AM  Page 8Figure 1. Chinese Productivity Relative to Productivity at the International Frontier
by Region and Industry, 1995 and 2002
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Sources: Groningen Growth and Development Centre, 60-Industry Database, September 2006 (www.ggdc.net); NBS.
a. Firms reporting negative value added are excluded; blank entries indicate missing data.Industry codes are as follows: 5, 
food, drink, and tobacco; 6, textiles; 7, clothing; 8, leather and footwear; 9, wood and products of wood and cork; 10, pulp, paper, 
and paper products; 11, printing and publishing; 12, mineral oil refining, coke, and nuclear fuel; 13, chemicals; 14, rubber and 
plastics; 15, nonmetallic mineral products; 16, base metals; 17, fabricated metal products; 18, mechanical engineering; 19, office 
machinery; 20, insulated wire; 21, other electrical machinery and apparatus not elsewhere classified; 22, electronic valves and 
tubes; 23, telecommunications equipment; 24, radio and television receivers; 25, scientific instruments; 26, other instruments; 27, 
motor vehicles; 28, building and repairing of ships and boats; 29, aircraft and spacecraft; 30, railroad equipment and transport 
equipment; 31, furniture, miscellaneous manufacturing, and recycling.
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industrial proﬁt rate of 5.6 percent.
8 Also, in that year estimated labor pro-
ductivity in China’s tobacco industry exceeded that for overall industry
by nearly a factor of ten. For these reasons, which are likely to result
from the government’s restrictions on entry to the tobacco industry, we
omit the food, beverage, and tobacco industry from our calculations in
table 2, which focuses on regional differences in China’s manufacturing
productivity in relation to the international frontier.
The Internal Gaps
China’s internal productivity gap can be described along two dimensions.
The ﬁrst is the gap between the advanced industrial sector and other, more
backward sectors, especially the rural agricultural sector, in which much
8. China Statistical Yearboook 2002, table 14-6.
Table 2. Industrial Labor Productivity at the International Frontier and in China,
1995 and 2002a
Regionb
Year Coastal Northeastern Central Western
1995
Ratio of frontier productivity 8.55 15.87 26.32 33.33
to productivity in China
Ratio of coastal productivity 1.00 1.86 3.08 3.90
to regional productivity
2002
Ratio of frontier productivity 4.31 8.93 8.00 10.87
to productivity in China
Ratio of coastal productivity 1.00 2.07 1.86 2.52
to regional productivity




Sources: Groningen Growth and Development Centre, 60-Industry Database, September 2006 (www.ggdc.net); National
Bureau of Statistics, China; authors’ calculations.
a. Data exclude food, beverage, and tobacco industry.
b. Data are aggregations of ﬁrm-level data.
10269-01_Jefferson-rev.qxd  1/29/07  10:56 AM  Page 10of China’s labor force resides as underemployed or surplus labor. We also
look at productivity gaps between Chinese industry and the Chinese ser-
vices sector, as well as gaps across regions within the services sector. The
second dimension of the internal productivity gap is that within industry
across regions, and in particular between the advanced industrial sector,
primarily concentrated in parts of China’s coastal region, and the rela-
tively backward industries located in the northeastern, central, and west-
ern regions. We examine the magnitudes of both types of gaps.
THE AGRICULTURAL-INDUSTRIAL GAP. Table 3 compares average labor
productivity (output per worker) in the agricultural sector broadly deﬁned
(agriculture, forestry, and fishing) with that in the industrial (including
construction) sector.
9 The last column in the table reports the ratio of the
two productivities. The table reveals, ﬁrst, that the agricultural-industrial
productivity gap is large. In 2005 the average industrial worker produced
more than seven times as much as his or her agricultural counterpart.
Moreover, the gap has grown. From 6.1 in 1980, the ratio of industrial to
agricultural productivity had shrunk by 1990 to 4.3, but thereafter it grew
continuously until, at 7.1 in 2005, it surpassed the 1980 level.
REGIONAL AND SECTORAL GAPS. The data in table 3 provide a histori-
cal perspective on changes in the agricultural-industrial productivity gap,
but they do not provide insight into the variety and range of productivity
gaps that exist across regions and sectors, including the services sector.
To provide this broader picture, table 4 uses official NBS data to com-
pute the gaps for the industry, agriculture, and services sectors across the
four regions for 1995 and 2004. We address both the magnitude of the
gaps and whether, during 1995–2004, they have tended to widen or nar-
row. The table uses productivity in China’s coastal industry, which we
designate as China’s technology frontier, as the point of reference in
these comparisons.
We examine first the gaps in 1995. Ratios of productivity in coastal
industry to that of industry in the other three regions ranged from 1.78
(western) to 1.32 (northeastern). The largest ratios are those between
coastal industry and the agricultural sector, which range from 4.47 (for
Gary H. Jefferson, Albert G. Z. Hu, and Jian Su 11
9. Of course, for purposes of analyzing patterns of efﬁcient factor allocation, the relevant
measure is marginal, not average productivity. We assume that labor’s output elasticities in
the different sectors are not vastly different from one another. 


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































10269-01_Jefferson-rev.qxd  1/29/07  10:56 AM  Page 13coastal agriculture) to 10.22 (for western). The ratios between coastal
industry and the services sector range from 1.05 (coastal) to 2.42 (west-
ern). For 2004, table 4 shows a tendency for the industry gaps to shrink,
particularly that between the coastal and the northeastern industrial sec-
tors, where industry in the northeastern region appears to have surpassed
that of the coast, even as the coastal industry–regional agricultural gaps
increased substantially. The gaps between coastal industry and the services
sector also tended to increase. Among the eleven pairwise cases, we find
a widening of the gap from 1995 to 2004 in all but three. Although some
convergence of labor productivity has occurred within industry, the pro-
ductivity gap between industry and the agricultural and services sectors
generally increased during 1995–2004.
MEASUREMENT ISSUES. The disparities between industry and agricul-
ture and between services and agriculture may be somewhat overstated if
workers who are temporarily migrating to the cities are included in the
agricultural totals. Xiaoquan Ding, and Yang Du and Albert Park, argue
that the data in the China Statistical Yearbook overstate the number of
workers in agriculture.
10 According to Ding, “the official statistics on
agriculture employment are based on the registered permanent residence
system. Although this system impedes rural residents from obtaining
urban registration, it cannot prevent rural residents from moving to cities
and working in industries.”
11 Ding asserts that many migrant workers liv-
ing in cities and those working in township and village enterprises are
erroneously classiﬁed as agriculture workers. Thomas Rawski and Robert
Mead estimate that, in the early 1990s, the overcount may have been as
high as 100 million, so that 230 million Chinese workers rather than the
reported 330 million were actually working in agriculture.
12
Loren Brandt, Xiaodong Zhu, and Chang-Tai Hsieh construct an alterna-
tive series of sectoral employment ﬁgures to take this possible miscounting
into account.
13 Their agricultural employment data are constructed by taking
the NBS estimate, which is already adjusted for employment in rural town-
ship and village enterprises, and further correcting for those working in pri-
vate ﬁrms or self-employed in nonagricultural activities. This correction
results in a substantial shift in employment shares: whereas the NBS data
14 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2006
10. Ding (2001); Du and Park (2005).
11. Ding (2001, p. 23).
12. Rawski and Mead (1998).
13. Brandt, Zhu, and Hsieh (forthcoming).
10269-01_Jefferson-rev.qxd  1/29/07  10:56 AM  Page 14for 1995 indicate that 52.2 percent of China’s workforce was employed in
agriculture in that year, Brandt, Zhu, and Hsieh’s corrected ﬁgures set the
share at 44.1 percent. The shares of the industrial and services sectors,
recorded by the NBS as 23.0 percent and 24.8 percent, respectively, in 1995
rise to 27.1 percent and 28.8 percent under the corrections. The corrections
by Brandt, Zhu, and Hsieh end in 2000; we therefore adjust the 2005 NBS
ﬁgures by assuming that the decline in China’s agricultural employment
share from 2000 to 2005 proceeds at more or less the same rate as in
Brandt’s adjusted data for 1990–2000, that is, an annual decrease of 1 per-
centage point. Thus we assume that China’s agricultural employment share
in 2005 was 34 percent, which roughly corresponds to that in South Korea
in 1982 (ﬁgure 2).
14 To complete the series, we reallocate the agricultural
Gary H. Jefferson, Albert G. Z. Hu, and Jian Su 15
14. In fact, figure 2, once corrected using Brandt, Zhu, and Hsieh’s estimates of
China’s employment shares, tracks very closely with South Korea’s decline over 1962–82
from 63 percent to 39 percent.
Figure 2. Share of Agriculture in Employment in China, Other Selected Asian
Countries, and the United States, 1948–2004
Sources: Countries’ national statistical offices.
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10269-01_Jefferson-rev.qxd  1/29/07  10:56 AM  Page 15workers who are dropped in 2005 to the industrial and services sectors in the
same proportions as the reallocations to these two sectors for 2000.
We ﬁrst use these corrected agricultural and industry employment ﬁg-
ures to adjust the labor productivity calculations shown in table 3.
15 With
the adjusted ﬁgures, we ﬁnd that the ratio of industrial to agricultural labor
productivity for 1995 declines from 5.42 to 3.89; for 2005 the decline is
from 7.11 to 4.47. Although the adjusted ﬁgures still show an increase in
the industry-agriculture productivity gap from 1995 to 2000, this increase
is substantially less than implied by the original NBS data.
We also use these adjusted employment data to correct the pattern of
productivity gaps shown in table 4. Because the employment adjustments
by Brandt and coauthors for industry and services are nearly identical for
1995 (1.18 and 1.16, respectively), as are our extensions for 2004 (1.24 and
1.20, respectively), and because the absence of provincial and regional cor-
rections requires us to assume that the adjustments are uniform over each
of the four regions, we do not recompute the ratios for coastal industry to
noncoastal industry or for coastal industry to services. We do recompute
the ratios for coastal industry to agriculture, which are shown in table 4.
Although, as in table 3, the industry-agriculture gaps using the adjusted
data grow substantially less than those using the original NBS data, the
results do not change our basic conclusion that overall, in relation to
coastal industry, the regional and sectoral productivity gaps grew from
1995 to 2004.
16
GAPS BETWEEN BACKWARD AND ADVANCED INDUSTRY: A CLOSER LOOK.
A second measurement issue relates to the measures of regional industrial
labor productivity using the data from the China Statistical Yearbook.
These data show three provinces with implausibly high or low levels of
labor productivity in 2004: at the high end are Heilongjiang at 95,195
yuan per worker and Xinjiang at 102,551 yuan per worker. At the low
end, Beijing’s labor productivity is 68,126 yuan per worker. To check
these productivity data, we use another set of NBS data that has been
16 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2006
15. We further assume that the allocation of excess nonagricultural workers to industry
and services is done in accord with the same proportional adjustments made to these sectors
in 2000.
16. These results are consistent with those in Naughton (forthcoming, ﬁgure 9-2) that
show an upward drift in China’s Gini coefﬁcient through the 1980s and 1990s, including a
sharp increase for the period 1996–2002.
10269-01_Jefferson-rev.qxd  1/29/07  10:56 AM  Page 16compiled for the “above-scale” (guimo yishang) enterprises with annual
sales in excess of 5 million yuan.
17 In addition to focusing on just those
enterprises that regularly report to the NBS, a further advantage of these data
is that they exclude construction, a component for which the employment
classiﬁcations are particularly questionable and whose exclusion allows for
comparisons using the conventional deﬁnition of industry. When we com-
pute the provincial comparisons using these data, we ﬁnd that the labor pro-
ductivity measure for Beijing moves into a plausible range, but those for
Heilongjiang and Xinjiang remain implausibly high, as does Yunnan’s in
addition, exceeding industry’s average labor productivity by 32, 74, and
50 percent, respectively. Closer inspection of these three provinces shows
that each is dominated by either petroleum extraction or the tobacco indus-
try, both of which enjoy extraordinary proﬁts that account for their high
value added per worker.
18 Therefore we drop these three provinces and
recalculate the regional labor productivities using only the remaining ones.
The productivity gaps for regional industry using these adjusted data are
shown in table 4. Unlike the broader industry data, these do not show 
the northeast surpassing the coast. The adjusted data continue to show
the central region lagging further behind the coastal and northeastern
regions, and the western region behind all the others.
These adjustments do not make a substantial difference to the measures
of agriculture and services productivity in relation to coastal industry
shown in table 4. However, we note that the more narrow deﬁnition of
industry, excluding construction and ﬁrms that do not qualify as “above
scale,” results in signiﬁcantly higher average productivity for coastal
industry (98,624 yuan per worker) than for the broad measure of industry
(65,410 yuan per worker). This disparity not only underscores the ten-
dency of the sectoral productivity gaps to increase when industry is limited
to its more formal definition, but also begins to give some indication of
the extent of productivity differences within the industrial sector, for
example between formal industry and construction and between the “above
scale” ﬁrms and the smaller industrial enterprises.
Gary H. Jefferson, Albert G. Z. Hu, and Jian Su 17
17. China Statistical Yearbook 2005, tables 14-2 and 14-5.
18. Speciﬁcally, proﬁt per employee in the petroleum extraction industry is 233,633
yuan per employee; for cigarette manufacturing, it is 184,075 per employee, whereas for
total (above-scale) industry, the profit rate is 18,597 yuan per employee (China Statisti-
cal Yearbook 2005, table 14-3).
10269-01_Jefferson-rev.qxd  1/29/07  10:56 AM  Page 17Table 2 also reports regional comparisons for the industrial sector.
These measures, too, cover a different set of ﬁrms from those in table 4.
The data in table 2 are based on calculations of labor productivity for our
sample of large and medium-size enterprises, which is still more limited
than the larger population of above-scale firms.
19 Our subset of this data
set also covers manufacturing only (excluding mining and electric
power generation) and compares levels for 1995 and 2002, the last year for
which data are available in the Groningen data set. A further difference
with the industry data in table 4 is that the table 2 data are deﬂated.
20
Although these data are thus not directly comparable to those in table 4,
they do provide a useful comparison across regions, in particular by omit-
ting the mining and petroleum sectors, which inflate the comprehensive
industry productivity measures for the northeastern and western regions.
Table 2 shows that the 1995 gaps were large, with ratios of coastal pro-
ductivity to regional productivity ranging from 3.90 for the western
region to 3.08 for the central region and 1.86 for the northeastern region.
By 2002, labor productivity in the central and western regions had
reduced the gap with the coastal region: the ratios for that year were 1.86
and 2.52, respectively. In contrast, labor productivity in the northeastern
region fell behind that of the coast, with the ratio of productivities rising
from 1.86 in 1995 to 2.07 in 2002. These manufacturing data that exclude
construction, mining, and power generation show persistent gaps between
coastal manufacturing and that in the other three regions. Although they
show a narrowing of the gaps between the central and western regions
and the coast, the gaps remain large. Combining our results in table 2 and
table 4, we ﬁnd that when industry is deﬁned broadly to include petroleum
extraction, the northeast is catching up with coastal industry. When indus-
try is limited to manufacturing, however, the northeast exhibits limited or
no catch-up. 
18 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2006
19. In 2005 industry excluding construction accounted for 86.8 percent of value added of
total industry (that is, industry including construction, or what NBS calls “secondary indus-
try”). Above-scale enterprises accounted for 87.3 percent and LMEs for 63.8 percent of
industry output (excluding construction; China Statistical Yearbook 2005, pp. 52, 489, 512).
20. The regional data are deﬂated by deﬂating value added for each of the LMEs using
a gross output price deﬂator constructed from current- and constant-price output deﬂators
reported by each ﬁrm. At the provincial level, the ﬁrm-level data are aggregated using each
ﬁrm’s share in total provincial value added as the weight. The regional data are a simple
average of the data for the included provinces.
10269-01_Jefferson-rev.qxd  1/29/07  10:56 AM  Page 18One shortcoming of our productivity comparisons thus far is that they
focus exclusively on labor productivity to the exclusion of capital produc-
tivity and the broader measure, total factor productivity. To remedy this
exclusion, we use our entire NBS large and medium-size enterprise (LME)
data set, which includes ﬁrm-level data (including manufacturing and min-
ing enterprises), to regress the log values of labor productivity, capital pro-
ductivity, and TFP on dummy variables for China’s major regions with
and without two-digit industry dummies.
21 These industry data include
mining and petroleum extraction and power generation. 
One immediately apparent result, shown in table 5, which estimates the
regional differences, and table 6, which summarizes these productivity
differentials, is that, as in the industry comparisons shown in table 2 and
figure 1, in 1995 the coastal region enjoyed a sizable labor productivity
advantage over each of the other three regions. The region that diverges
most from the coastal region is the northeastern region, followed by the
western and central regions. By 2004 all of these disparities had declined
substantially.
By contrast, we observe no comparable overall narrowing of the capital
productivity gap. In regressions without the industry dummies we observe
a consistent increase in the capital productivity gap, as the coast substan-
tially increases its capital efﬁciency relative to the other three regions. In
these estimates, therefore, we ﬁnd an overall convergence of labor produc-
tivity with a simultaneous divergence in capital productivity. In construct-
ing the TFP measures, the larger weight afforded to labor productivity in
part accounts for a pattern of overall convergence.
The inclusion of the industry dummies substantially alters the results.
For labor productivity, including the industry controls magniﬁes the pro-
ductivity disparities in both 1995 and 2004, although their inclusion does
not overturn the result of a robust convergence of industrial labor produc-
tivity across regions. The industry dummies have the opposite effect on
capital productivity, at least in 2004, tending to substantially reduce the
productivity gaps between the coast and each of the other three regions,
leaving the regional gaps in capital productivity only slightly altered
Gary H. Jefferson, Albert G. Z. Hu, and Jian Su 19
21. We use a Cobb-Douglas index with weights of 0.64 for labor and 0.36 for capital.
These are the values of the output elasticities of labor and capital, respectively, estimated
under the restriction of constant returns to scale.
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relative to 1995. These industry effects largely reﬂect the high concentra-
tion of extractive industries, including petroleum and natural gas extrac-
tion and petroleum refining, in the northeastern and western regions.
These capital-intensive industries, which exhibit high labor productivity,
also exhibit low capital productivity.
This summary of the results reinforces the notion that industrial labor
productivity across China’s regions is converging but that coastal indus-
try remains some distance ahead of the other regions. Although the
results using industry data that include mining and power generation
suggest more rapid catch-up than those using manufacturing alone, the
inclusion of these capital-intensive industries also follows a pattern in
which capital productivity in the three noncoastal regions is falling fur-
ther behind that of the coast, thereby slowing but not reversing the
catch-up of TFP. In the following two sections we investigate the dynam-
ics of productivity catch-up both internationally and within China’s
industrial sector.
Table 6. Comparisons of Industrial Productivity Estimates by Region
Ratio of coastal productivity to productivity in indicated region
Without industry With industry
dummy variables dummy variables
Dependent variable and region 1995 2004 1995 2004
Labor productivity (VA/L)
Coastal 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Central 1.52 1.07 1.66 1.29
Northeastern 1.97 1.15 2.13 1.39
Western 1.58 1.08 1.73 1.34
Capital productivity (VA/K)
Coastal 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Central 1.12 1.32 1.14 1.15
Northeastern 1.65 1.74 1.69 1.55
Western 1.24 1.47 1.23 1.29
Total factor productivity (TFP)
Coastal 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Central 1.32 1.18 1.39 1.22
Northeastern 1.83 1.39 1.90 1.45
Western 1.42 1.24 1.49 1.31
Source: Authors’ calculations using regression results in table 5.
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A question that is central to the pace and timing of China’s GDP catch-
up is how productivity growth in Chinese industry responds to the gap
between China’s productivity and the international productivity frontier.
Because many sources of productivity change, including resource shifts
across industries and regions within China, are commingled in the aggre-
gate data, we examine the importance of productivity gaps at the industry
level. The ﬁrm-level data are aggregated to the industry level for each
province, distinguishing twenty-seven industries and thirty-one provinces,
so that the unit of observation in the regression is the “province-industry-
year.” We relate the rate of growth between 1995 and 2002 of these
province-industry productivity observations to the gap between produc-
tivity in that province and industry and productivity at the international
frontier in 1995. We estimate the following basic equation:
where ln(GAP_FRONTi,j,1995) = ln(VA/L)FRONT,j,1995, − ln(VA/L)i,j,1995, and i
indexes provinces and j industries. (The rates of growth are annualized.)
To test for regional differences in the response, we include dummy values
of α1 for three of the four regions, where the dummy variables interact with
the 1995 productivity gaps.
Our priors are that α1 > 0, reﬂecting the fact that industries and regions
that are further behind the international productivity frontier can make big-
ger gains by exploiting the frontier technology, either by imitation or by
importing technology or capital. One might anticipate that the sign on α2
would likewise be positive, indicating that the more rapid is productivity
growth during 1995–2002 for a frontier industry, the more generally avail-
able the useful technology and spillovers are in its lagging Chinese counter-
part industry during the same period. Alternatively, China’s comparative
advantage may be greatest in industries such as textiles, apparel, and
footwear, where productivity growth in the advanced industrial economies
is slow. In this case such Chinese industries might grow rapidly, moderniz-
()
,, ,, 1
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10269-01_Jefferson-rev.qxd  1/29/07  10:56 AM  Page 22ing in the process, leading to a negative α2. Similarly, a negative α2 would
also arise where productivity changes were exceptionally rapid in the
frontier industries, providing little opportunity for Chinese ﬁrms to begin
to catch up technologically, discouraging modernization. As these consid-
erations suggest, the regression results should be interpreted as casting
light only on medium-term responses in China’s recent development.
They are informative about the path that China is on but cannot be used
with conﬁdence to infer conditions well outside the data, such as long-run
equilibrium conditions.
The estimation results, shown in table 7, are robust to alternative spec-
iﬁcations and samples, showing that the rate of industrial productivity
growth during 1995–2002 rises monotonically with the distance of the
relevant industry from the corresponding frontier productivity level in
1995. The quadratic term becomes highly statistically signiﬁcant when the
constant, which itself is generally not highly signiﬁcant, is constrained to
equal zero.
The ﬁndings in table 7 are consistent with Denison’s ﬁnding (table 1)
that the rate of labor productivity growth in catch-up countries slows as
these countries move toward the international productivity frontier. We
further ﬁnd, as shown by the large coefﬁcient on the variable that interacts
China’s coastal region dummy with the gap variable, that coastal ﬁrms
generally enjoy higher rates of productivity growth than do ﬁrms in the
other three regions for every level of the productivity gap. The results
reported for regression 7-5 in table 7 are mapped into figure 3, which
shows how productivity growth in both the coastal and other regions
relates to an industry’s productivity gap, expressed as the ratio of frontier
productivity to Chinese productivity in a given industry, assuming a 
2 percent annual growth rate of productivity at the frontier. The ﬁgure
illustrates the potential importance of pure technological catch-up at the
ﬁrm level. The effects of gaps are highly signiﬁcant, and the average pro-
ductivity improvement of coastal industries in the face of international
gaps is substantial at the level of the gap observed in most industries in
1995. For example, with a ratio between industry productivities of 10,
which is smaller than that in many industries in that year, the implied rate
of labor productivity growth is 11 percent a year in the coastal region,
indicating a rapid reduction of such industry gaps even with substantial
growth in frontier productivity. The predicted growth in productivity for
a comparable gap in other regions is lower but still substantial (roughly
Gary H. Jefferson, Albert G. Z. Hu, and Jian Su 23
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































10269-01_Jefferson-rev.qxd  1/29/07  10:56 AM  Page 248 percent). The estimation results shown in table 7 and their illustration
in figure 3 also imply that, at least for manufacturing, the northeastern,
central, and western regions may enjoy rapid productivity growth but
will not fully catch up to the coast, at least in the medium term. As the
results show, productivity growth in these regions will grow as fast as
that in coastal manufacturing only as long as a substantial productivity
gap persists.
Factors that may explain this persistent disparity between the coastal
and other regions include the concentration of FDI and R&D spending in
the coastal region and the better development of institutional arrange-
ments, including the legal system and human capital development in the
coastal region. Together these factors may enable coastal industry to
take greater advantage of international technology than industry in other
regions can, even though its gap with the world frontier may be consider-
ably smaller than those of industry in other regions. We return to these
issues later in the paper.
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Figure 3. Response of the Chinese Productivity Growth Rate to the Gap with the
International Frontier
a
Source: Authors’ calculations using regression results in table 7.
a. Calculated assuming a 2 percent productivity growth rate at the international frontier, indicated by the horizontal line.
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Our investigation of the responsiveness of labor productivity growth in
China’s domestic industry to international productivity gaps has shown,
with the existing large gap, an initial tendency for sustained labor produc-
tivity growth and catch-up, particularly in the coastal region. We also ﬁnd,
in tables 2, 4, 5, and 6, evidence within China’s industrial sector of catch-
up with coastal industry by the other regions, at least for labor productivity
and TFP, if not for capital productivity. This part of the paper investigates
the processes through which Chinese ﬁrms may or may not respond to pro-
ductivity differentials within Chinese industry by closing the internal pro-
ductivity gap. The analysis examines the following issues: What are the
contributions of labor reallocation and capital accumulation to produc-
tivity growth? Can evidence be found of improved allocative efﬁciency
within China’s industrial sector, that is, a closing of productivity gaps
arising from the reallocation of labor and investment to firms that offer
higher returns? And what is the contribution of the exit and entry of ﬁrms
to industrial productivity growth?
The Contribution of Labor Reallocation
As reported above, we ﬁnd large differences in labor productivity among
sectors and regions within China. Given these differences, the realloca-
tion of labor from low- to high-productivity sectors or firms could have
substantial effects on aggregate output and productivity. To clarify the
potential importance of this mechanism for explaining the rapid growth of
Chinese output in the last decade and its potential importance for future
growth, we consider a two-sector model in which labor productivity in
agriculture is designated Pa and that in industry gPa. Assuming that neither
productivity in agriculture nor productivity in industry changes signiﬁcantly
with the reallocation of labor, moving one unit of labor from agriculture to
industry increases output by (g − 1)Pa.
Taking the labor force L0 as given, with an initial fraction β of L
employed in agriculture, aggregate output is
QP g P L g P L aa a =+ − () [] =+ − () [] ββ β β 11 00 .
26 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2006
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percentage rate of change of β is −b), the percentage rate of change of Q
is simply
This expression can be used to calculate the growth in total output arising
from reallocation across any two sectors whose productivities differ. Note
that the crucial parameters for this calculation, g and β, enter nonlinearly.
Figure 4 shows how the contribution to output growth of annually reallo-
cating 1 percent of the labor in the low-productivity sector to the high-
productivity sector varies with g. The ﬁgure shows this relation for three
different values of β, the initial fraction of labor in the low-productivity sec-
tor. Obviously, the larger is β, the greater is the contribution of reallocating
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Figure 4. Impact of Labor Reallocation on GDP Growth for Alternative Shares of
Employment in Low-Income Sectors
a













a. Assumes that 1 percent of the low-income labor force moves into the high-income sector each year; β indicates the initial 
share of the labor force in the low-income sector.
10269-01_Jefferson-rev.qxd  1/29/07  10:56 AM  Page 27marginal returns to the size of the gap is not as obvious. The concavity of
the response function reﬂects the fact that, for a given β and a given level of
productivity in the low-productivity sector, a larger gap implies higher out-
put in the high-productivity sector and a larger overall economy. Although
the increase in total output from a reallocation of a unit is proportional to
the productivity gap, it represents a smaller percentage of total output.
Figure 4 allows us to examine some of these effects quantitatively. The
employment share of China’s agricultural sector is currently around 0.4.
Assuming a ratio of industrial to agricultural productivity of 5 (roughly the
gap shown in table 3 for 1995), our model predicts that a 1 percent annual
labor reallocation from agriculture to industry will result in approximately
a 0.5-percentage-point contribution to annual GDP growth. Of course,
much of China’s industrial sector is also backward. As a further illustration,
therefore, consider migration from, say, the 80 percent of the labor force
that may reside in the aggregate of China’s relatively backward agricul-
tural and industrial sectors. Assuming an average productivity ratio of
2.5 for this low-productivity “sector,” if 1 percent of its labor migrates
each year to the higher-productivity industrial sector, the result, as shown
by the upper curve in ﬁgure 4, is a 1-percentage-point increase in annual
GDP growth. This migration, of course, reduces the employment share of
this low-productivity sector. When it is only 50 percent (the middle curve
in ﬁgure 4), the same 1 percent reallocation, given the same ratio of 2.5,
generates additional GDP growth of less than 0.5 percentage point.
To summarize, two factors lead to a diminishing contribution to GDP
growth from labor reallocation. The ﬁrst of these, particularly with respect
to agriculture, is the diminishing number of surplus workers as a share of
the total workforce. The second, which acts as a drag on the ability of labor
reallocation to sustain rapid GDP growth, is the fact that although widen-
ing gaps signal greater productivity gains for each migrating worker, they
also imply smaller relative contributions to GDP growth, since increasing
productivities in the advanced areas increase GDP. By entering the denom-
inator of the GDP growth calculations, the higher GDP resulting from the
larger gaps causes productivity gains from labor reallocations to make
smaller proportionate contributions to overall growth.
Evidence of Efﬁcient Reallocation among Industrial Firms
Differences in productivity across industries and regions can be as large
as or larger than the average gap between agriculture and industry dis-
28 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2006
10269-01_Jefferson-rev.qxd  1/29/07  10:56 AM  Page 28cussed above. To what extent does it appear that labor and capital have
been reallocated from less to more productive industrial ﬁrms in China
during the last decade? We ﬁrst examine the behavior of ﬁrms in our NBS
panel of large and medium-size enterprises that were operating and reporting
in 1995, 2000, and 2004, testing to see if a ﬁrm’s initial factor productivities
affect subsequent growth in the ﬁrm’s labor, capital, and value added.
Later we will compare the behavior of these ﬁrms with that of ﬁrms that
exit or enter during the period. We also examine the change in factor pro-
ductivities themselves. To address these issues, the following equations
are estimated for the two periods 1995–2000 and 2000–04:
where TFPi,t = (VA/K)i,t
α (VA/L)i,t
1−α and MPL and MPK are the marginal
products of labor and capital, respectively, and rates of growth are annu-
alized. The inclusion of the interaction terms allows us to test the differ-
ences in adjustment dynamics across regions. (REGj is a dummy variable
taking on the value 1 for a firm in region j and zero otherwise, with the
central region as the omitted region.)
The results in table 8 show that, in both 1995–2000 and 2000–04,
changes in the employment of labor and capital across industrial ﬁrms
were positively related to the ﬁrms’ initial levels of labor and capital pro-
ductivity, respectively. For example, in 2000–04, doubling MPL adds
about 10 percentage points to the annual growth rate of labor in the central
region. Except in the coastal region, growth of labor was more responsive
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Table 8. Reallocation of Labor, Capital, and Output across Industrial Firms,
1995–2000 and 2000–04
a
Independent variable 1995–2000 2000–04





lnMPLi,t−τ × coastal −0.004 −0.020***
(0.007) (0.006)
lnMPLi,t−τ × northeastern −0.022** 0.027***
(0.011) (0.010)
lnMPLi,t−τ × western −0.030 0.017*
(0.010)*** (0.009)
No. of observations 2,639 2,684
Adjusted R
2 0.081 0.082





lnMPKi,t−τ × coastal −0.017 0.007
(0.031) (0.026)
lnMPKi,t−τ × northeastern 0.042 −0.000
(0.040) (0.036)
lnMPKi,t−τ × western 0.059 −0.004
(0.039) (0.032)
No. of observations 2,639 2,684
Adjusted R
2 0.057 0.042





lnTFPi,t−τ × coastal 0.111*** 0.018
(0.028) (0.028)
lnTFPi,t−τ × northeastern −0.063 −0.096**
(0.048) (0.047)
lnTFPi,t−τ × western −0.064 −0.022
(0.040) (0.039)




10269-01_Jefferson-rev.qxd  1/29/07  10:56 AM  Page 30in this later period than in 1995–2000. The increase in the northeast may
reﬂect the extensive layoffs associated with sanctioned furloughs (xiagang)
at state-owned enterprises, which were relatively concentrated in that region.
The responsiveness of capital formation is similar to that of labor growth,
with roughly the same elasticity of growth with respect to its own initial pro-
ductivity. However, in all regions capital was somewhat more responsive in
the earlier than in the later period. Although factor productivities thus play
an important role in the allocation of labor and capital, they explain only a
small fraction of the variation in labor and capital growth across ﬁrms.
The results for the value-added equation (equation 5) are somewhat sur-
prising. Higher total factor productivity in the initial year (1995 or 2000)
slows the growth of value added. This result seems paradoxical since, having
determined that high initial levels of factor productivity motivate the accu-
mulation of labor and capital, one might have anticipated that high TFP
would also lead to relatively rapid growth of value added. If, in fact, growth
of value added tends to be slower among ﬁrms with high initial levels of
TFP, this implies that the higher rates of growth of inputs of labor and capi-
tal are associated with substantially slower TFP growth. Such a relationship
would be consistent with the idea that low-productivity ﬁrms were catching
up with high-productivity ﬁrms in this period.
This productivity catch-up hypothesis is supported by the regressions 
in the last panel of table 8, which show that ﬁrms with low initial TFP 
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lnTFPi,t−τ × coastal 0.119*** 0.058**
(0.024) (0.024)
lnTFPi,t−τ × northeastern 0.008 −0.049
(0.041) (0.041)
lnTFPi,t−τ × western −0.014 0.009
(0.035) (0.034)
No. of observations 2,604 2,633
Adjusted R
2 0.241 0.186
Source: Authors’ regressions using the NBS large and medium-size enterprise data set.
a. Standard errors are in parentheses. Asterisks indicate statistical signiﬁcance at the ***1 percent, **5 percent, or *10 percent level.
Table 8. Reallocation of Labor, Capital, and Output across Industrial Firms,
1995–2000 and 2000–04
a (Continued)
Independent variable 1995–2000 2000–04
10269-01_Jefferson-rev.qxd  1/29/07  10:56 AM  Page 31exhibit faster growth of TFP. This catch-up is likely to reﬂect a diffusion
of technology within China’s industrial system, as less productive ﬁrms
access technologies that enable them to move toward industry’s technol-
ogy frontier. Our results also show that the coastal region exhibits less of a
tendency for TFP to converge than do the other regions of China. During
2000–04, productivity catch-up is somewhat more pronounced in both the
northeastern and coastal regions than it was in the earlier period.
One possible interpretation of the relative lack of catch-up in the
coastal area is that that region serves as a cauldron of technology devel-
opment, where the country’s largest R&D performers and exporters can
extend their technological advantages. (In 2004 thirty of the ﬁfty ﬁrms
with the largest R&D expenditure were located in the coastal provinces.)
The overall impression conveyed by table 8 is that China’s industrial
economy exhibits attributes of efficient reallocation that bode well for
the ability of firms with lagging productivity to access the technologies
and organizational changes needed to capture some of the productivity
advantages of the more efficient firms. The results also show a degree of
factor mobility, enabling resources to move to higher-productivity uses
within China’s industrial system. These dynamics represent an impor-
tant engine for sustaining productivity growth outside coastal industry
and for further reducing the productivity gap within China’s domestic
industrial economy. 
Although these dynamic adjustment processes probably account for
some of the interregional industrial productivity catch-up observed during
1995–2002 (table 2) and 1995–2004 (tables 4 and 6), we emphasize that
this catch-up remains partial and uneven. Moreover, our results in table 7
and ﬁgure 3 strongly imply the existence of structural limits to full catch-
up of manufacturing productivity in the northeastern, central, and western
regions to that of the coast.
The Contribution of Exit and Entry
The most important shortcoming of the above analysis of resource alloca-
tion and productivity convergence within China’s industrial system is
that it is limited to ﬁrms that survived over the entire period 1995–2004.
Firms omitted from the balanced sample include many firms that entered
or exited during the period, as well as restructured ﬁrms whose identity
changed with restructuring, making it impossible to track them separately
32 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2006
10269-01_Jefferson-rev.qxd  1/29/07  10:56 AM  Page 32from exiting and entering ﬁrms. Together these processes of exit, entry, and
restructuring are likely to have been an important element in improving
productivity. We therefore extend the analysis to account for their impact.
Table 9 uses the full sample of firms over 1995–2004 to estimate the
productivity differentials among three categories of ﬁrms: ﬁrms that sur-
vive in the LME data over the entire period 1995–2004 (that is, the ﬁrms
included in the table 8 regressions), ﬁrms that exited from the data set, and
ﬁrms that entered it. Separate dummy variables for the three types of ﬁrms
are used for each of the three-year periods: 1996–98, 1999–2001, and
2002–04. We estimate differences among these ﬁrm categories for labor,
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productivity productivity Total factor
Independent variable (VA/L)( VA/K) productivity
Constant 57.694*** 1.150*** 12.124***
(0.522) (0.080) (0.092)
Survivors, 1996–98 −6.343*** −0.409** −1.590***
(1.086) (0.166) (0.113)
Survivors, 1999–2001 4.667*** −0.433*** 0.112
(1.080) (0.165) (0.190)
Survivors, 2002–04 18.937*** −0.285 2.624***
(1.270) (0.194) (0.224)
Exits, 1996–98 −24.537*** −0.411*** −4.469***
(0.911) (0.139) (0.161)
Exits, 1999–2001 −30.899*** −0.291*** −5.687***
(0.596) (0.091) (0.105)
Exits, 2002–04 −16.733*** −0.271*** −3.568***
(0.513) (0.078) (0.090)
Entrants, 1996–98 12.149*** 0.046 1.851***
(0.564) (0.086) (0.099)
Entrants, 1999–2001 30.155*** 0.661*** 5.229***
(0.572) (0.087) (0.101)
Entrants, 2002–04 16.232*** 1.197*** 5.460***
(0.598) (0.091) (0.105)
Adjusted R
2 0.043 0.002 0.057
Source: Authors’ regressions using the NBS large and medium-size enterprise data set.
a. Survivors report in all ten years, exits report in year t but not t + 1, and entrants report in year t but not t − 1; any firm that
exits in one period is captured by the constant in earlier periods, and any firm that enters in one period is captured by the con-
stant in later periods. All regressions are on 167,683 observations. Observations for which VA/L > 1,000,000 yuan per worker
are omitted. Standard errors are in parentheses. Asterisks indicate statistical significance at the ***1 percent, **5 percent, or
*10 percent level.
10269-01_Jefferson-rev.qxd  1/29/07  10:56 AM  Page 33capital, and total factor productivity. The results for labor productivity
show a distinct pattern in which, relative to the survivors in 1996–98, the
exiting ﬁrms exhibit low productivity, whereas the entrants exhibit high
productivity. During 1996–98 the labor productivity of exiting ﬁrms was
35 percent lower, and that of entering ﬁrms 36 percent higher, than that of
the survivors in the same period. In the following three-year period, the
corresponding numbers are 57 percent and 41 percent. Finally, in 2002–04
the labor productivity of exiting ﬁrms was 47 percent lower than that of
survivors, but entrants were marginally less productive than the survivors.
The importance of exit, entry, and restructuring to overall productiv-
ity depends on how frequently they take place. Our data show a high
incidence of both exit and entry: nearly 146,000 firms either entered or
exited the sample over the nine-year period, drawn from an annual pop-
ulation of 22,000 to 27,000 firms. The large numbers of both exiting and
entering firms (roughly as many exited as entered), together with the
signiﬁcant differences between their average productivity and that of sur-
viving ﬁrms, suggest that they are indeed an important source of China’s
industrial productivity growth, but without knowing the size of the firms
involved, we cannot precisely measure their contribution.
We have not measured changes in capital productivity in China over
the past decade in relation to the international technology frontier in a
manner similar to our analysis of labor productivity in table 2. Based on
data from the NBS-LME data set, ﬁgure 5 shows that, after bottoming out
in 1998, capital productivity began to rise monotonically through 2005.
This rise is consistent with our ﬁndings that ﬁrms with high capital pro-
ductivity tend to capture new investment and that the exit-entry phenom-
enon contributes substantially to improvements in capital productivity.
The correspondence between the path of capital productivity shown in
table 5 and the returns to capital productivity from exit and entry is
notable. As table 9 shows, the increase in capital productivity associated
with new entry was insigniﬁcant during 1996–98 but turned highly signif-
icant during 1999–2001 and became still more robust during 2002–04.
22
Although the incidence of exit and entry shows no sign of having
abated during our ten-year sample, we do see a decline in the resulting
productivity gain, at least for labor. The exiting ﬁrms in 2002–04 were not
34 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2006
22. Jefferson and Su (2006) also ﬁnd that restructuring (that is, conversions of state-
owned enterprises into shareholding enterprises) results in higher capital productivity.
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and, unlike the entrants during 1996–2001, which were signiﬁcantly more
productive on average than their survivor counterparts, the entrants during
2002–04 were only about as productive as their cohort survivor group.
This result suggests that, assuming some observed entry and exit is due to
enterprise restructuring, either the ﬁrms for which the most value added
could be captured tended to be restructured early, or, where there were
multiple restructurings, that they were subject to diminishing returns. We
anticipate that, over time, enterprise restructuring in China’s industrial
sector will make smaller contributions to overall productivity growth.
To summarize, we have analyzed two major sources of catch-up in
China’s economy. These are increased allocative efficiency, based on
the reallocation of capital and labor to the more productive firms and
sectors and the diffusion of technology to the relatively backward firms
to enable their productivity catch-up; and exit and entry, which we sug-
gest is likely in part to be associated with enterprise restructuring.
Although each of these is an important source of productivity growth,
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Figure 5. Marginal Product of Capital in China, 1995–2005
Source: Authors’ calculations using NBS data.
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backward regions and sectors and its more advanced ones, the contribu-
tion of each to continuing productivity growth and GDP growth is likely
to diminish over time.
How Sustainable Is China’s International Catch-Up?
Whether China, and in particular its coastal industry, can continue to close
the gap with the advanced economies depends broadly on two factors. The
ﬁrst is China’s ability to sustain and expand its capacity both to create and
absorb new domestic technology and to absorb imported technology. The
second factor, on which the ﬁrst substantially depends, is China’s ability,
through the functioning of its political economy, to sustain momentum for
the underlying institutional reforms that shape the incentives to develop
and employ new technologies, accumulate capital, and reallocate labor.
Here we discuss the capacity for sustained economic growth through tech-
nology development. The next section focuses on the political economy
and institutional underpinnings of China’s economic growth.
The international productivity gap analysis reported in table 7 and depicted
in ﬁgure 3 strongly suggests that China’s coastal industrial economy can sus-
tain high rates of productivity growth as it reduces its technology gap with
the international frontier. A central theme of the endogenous growth litera-
ture, however, is that productivity growth is not sustained by manna from
heaven; rather, it is the result of deliberate investment in technological oppor-
tunity that promises competitive risk-adjusted economic returns.
Here we investigate the sources and measures of technology develop-
ment that are responsible for driving the technological advance of Chi-
nese industry, particularly in the coastal region. Speciﬁcally, we examine
the proposition that China has begun its science and technology (S&T)
takeoff, as measured both by a rapid rise in R&D spending as a share of
GDP and by a surge in patenting activity; we argue that, from a compara-
tive and historical perspective, this takeoff is not likely to be reversed.
China’s Science and Technology Takeoff
The historical relationship between R&D spending and GDP in devel-
oping countries shows a striking pattern: as a country’s R&D spending
36 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2006
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to the vicinity of 2 percent, and ﬁnally levels off in the range of 2 to 3 per-
cent of GDP. This pattern is particularly robust for countries with large
populations, and on average it takes place over the course of a single
decade. Jian Gao and Jefferson characterize this phenomenon of an abrupt
one-time increase in R&D intensity as the “science and technology take-
off.”
23 They identify the statistical regularities of such takeoffs and the
underlying theoretical and empirical conditions that might explain them.
Figure 6 shows the pattern of R&D takeoff for ﬁve countries. The three
large OECD economies in the sample show a similar pattern of S&T take-
off. In each of these countries, when the ratio of R&D spending to GDP
breached the 1 percent threshold, R&D spending continued to outpace
GDP growth until R&D intensity stabilized in the range of 2 to 3 percent
of GDP. The transition period lasted about ten years on average, ranging
from about five years in the case of South Korea to about twenty years
for Japan.
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Figure 6. Research and Development Spending in Five Countries, 1950–2004
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Jefferson identify four factors that, they argue, are now driving China’s
S&T takeoff. Brieﬂy, these are a transition from the consumption of ﬁnal
goods that are low in technology content to goods high in technology con-
tent; the accumulation of complements to R&D, including investments
in information technology and human capital; access to the world’s knowl-
edge base and expansion of technological opportunity through interna-
tional trade and FDI; and exploitation of the wage-productivity gap,
including the tendency for compensation of home-country R&D personnel
to lag behind that of their OECD counterparts.
This phenomenon of R&D intensiﬁcation is found most consistently in
more populous countries, perhaps because their size allows for the cre-
ation of scale economies across a broad set of industries. In China the lure
of FDI to exploit the potential of the country’s domestic markets, as well
as its comparatively high levels of basic education and literacy, may also
be factors.
25
Figure 6 shows that China, having achieved a ratio of R&D spending to
GDP of 1.4 percent in 2005, is firmly engaged in its S&T takeoff. This
rapid expansion of R&D spending has established an important channel
through which China’s industrial enterprises are able to imitate, adapt, and
improve on foreign technologies. China’s S&T takeoff, which represents
growing capabilities of Chinese organizations to innovate and imitate, is
arguably the critical mechanism for sustaining China’s catch-up. Our his-
torical and comparative perspective indicates that this catch-up is likely to
be sustainable, as it was for the larger established OECD economies and
for the now-high-income East Asian economies. If China follows the path
of East Asia’s recently industrialized economies—including South Korea,
Taiwan, and Singapore, all of which have completed their S&T takeoffs—
as well as the larger OECD economies, the intensity of China’s R&D
38 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2006
24. Jones (1995).
25. The factors that drive the S&T takeoff are also those that account for the leveling
off of R&D intensity, that is, the tendency for the advanced economies to share a similar set
of conditions: similar levels of technology intensity in consumption and production, the
creation of similar sets of physical infrastructure and human capital complements to R&D
labor, a more or less identical international technology frontier, and comparable wages for
R&D personnel. The equalization of these four factors across the advanced economies
causes their R&D intensities to converge within a narrow range, thus bringing an end to the
S&T takeoff.
10269-01_Jefferson-rev.qxd  1/29/07  10:56 AM  Page 38effort, if not yet its quality, is likely to approach that of the major advanced
economies sometime during the next decade.
Patenting
Figure 7 shows the surge in patenting in China that began in 1999, in part
reﬂecting the implementation of several key patent law changes in antici-
pation of China’s accession to the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects
of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) of the WTO. Hu and Jefferson
show that a critical driver of the patenting surge has been FDI.26 Firms,
especially domestic ﬁrms, that were particularly patent intensive were
typically located in those three-digit industries that exhibited the highest
FDI concentrations. This association suggests that the technology transfer
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Figure 7. Patent Applications in China, 1986–2004
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tion. Domestic ﬁrms accounted for 60,000 to 70,000 invention patents in
2004 and for virtually all of the approximately 220,000 utility model
patent applications ﬁled that year.
27 This high incidence of patenting for
both imitation (associated with utility model patents) and innovation indi-
cates that China’s ﬁrms are developing innovative capabilities that are
enabling them to rapidly absorb the inﬂow of foreign technology.
Together the rapid rise in R&D spending and the rapid growth in
patenting are key leading indicators of the capacity of China’s economy
to translate its growing resource base into new knowledge, which it can
then embody in increasingly efﬁcient production that draws it closer to
international state-of-the-art methods. Figures 6 and 7 substantially round
out the story of the catch-up of China’s advanced industrial sector with the
industrial capabilities of the OECD economies. The concentration of R&D
and FDI in China’s coastal economy helps to explain why China’s coastal
provinces appear to enjoy the structural advantages in productivity growth
and international technology catch-up depicted in table 7 and ﬁgure 3.
The Political Economy of China’s Economic Growth
In any country, the political system is important for economic growth,
because it deﬁnes the structure and functioning of the institutional arrange-
ments that shape incentives and economic performance.
28 In China, a low-
middle-income developing country whose transition from a planned
economy remains incomplete, the functioning of the political system is
critical in determining the nation’s capacity to assign and clarify property
rights. Clearly deﬁned property rights are needed to strengthen incentives
to accumulate and efﬁciently utilize economic resources, both labor and
capital, including physical, ﬁnancial, and human capital.
Table 10 identifies two bundles of institutional reforms that are par-
ticularly relevant to the ability of China’s economy to accumulate and
allocate the resources needed to reduce its productivity gaps. The ﬁrst bun-
dle relates to conditions that shape the capacity to reallocate labor from
40 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2006
27. The Chinese patent ofﬁce grants invention patents and utility model patents; the lat-
ter have less stringent requirements and extend shorter protection than invention patents.
28. See North (1994).
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sectors. These include elimination of the residency registration (hukou)
system, the establishment of land ownership rights to facilitate the sale
and consolidation of fragmented and unproductive agricultural plots, and
the creation of a social insurance system. The second bundle of institutional
arrangements relates to provisions that are needed to facilitate the develop-
ment and diffusion of technology, the restructuring of enterprises, and more
efficient capital utilization. For each of these institutions, table 10 identi-
fies its importance for reducing the relevant productivity gap. The politi-
cal factors that affect the likelihood of these institutional reforms being
advanced are discussed later in this section. These generally consist of
existing commitments that China’s government has made and its increas-
ing political responsiveness to China’s residents, who have a stake in con-
tinued prosperity.
To illustrate the importance of clarifying and reallocating property
rights for China’s future growth trajectory, we focus on just one of the
reforms identiﬁed in table 10, namely, the role of corporate governance
reform. Table 9 underscored the important contribution made by the exit
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Table 10. Areas Requiring Institutional Reform in China
Reform Importance
Institutional reforms affecting efﬁcient labor reallocation
Reform of the hukou system
Land ownership reform
Reform of the social insurance system




Antitrust legislation and merger and
acquisitions legislation
Corporate governance reform
Intellectual property rights enforcement
To facilitate rural-urban migration
To enable consolidation of small farms and
scale economies in farming and improve the
ability of farmers wishing to migrate to
liquidate their assets
To increase labor mobility and facilitate
enterprise restructuring
To improve the efﬁciency of capital allocation
To reduce impediments to factor mobility,
trade, and competition
To facilitate enterprise restructuring and
encourage the creation of ﬁrm-level scale
economies
To enhance ﬁrm efﬁciency and increase the
returns to innovation
Continuous strengthening needed to speed the
transition from imitation to innovation
10269-01_Jefferson-rev.qxd  1/29/07  10:56 AM  Page 41and entry of ﬁrms to the advance of both labor and capital productivity in
China’s industrial sector.
To clarify the institutional character of the exit-entry phenomenon,
we now compare the ownership structures of exiting and entering firms.
Figure 8 shows that they are very different. During 1996–2003 the major-
ity of exiting firms were state-owned enterprises, followed by collec-
tively owned enterprises and shareholding companies. By comparison, in
2001–03 fewer than 23 percent of new entrants and about twice that pro-
portion of exiting ﬁrms were state-owned enterprises. All forms of non-
42 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2006
Figure 8. Distribution of Exiting and Entering Firms by Form of Ownership, 
1996–98 to 2002–03




















































10269-01_Jefferson-rev.qxd  1/29/07  10:56 AM  Page 42state and noncollective ownership are more likely to be found among
entrants than among exiting ﬁrms. Speciﬁcally, entrants are far more likely
to be private, shareholding, foreign, or overseas ﬁrms than their exiting
counterparts.
29 These results suggest that part of the exit-entry phenome-
non is associated with restructuring involving a change in ownership form.
There is a clear association between the institutional and political economy
side of China’s economy and its ability to create and sustain productiv-
ity growth through laws, regulations, procedures, and factor markets that
are deﬁned by the political system.
How Sustainable Is China’s Institutional Reform?
How likely is China to sustain the momentum of reform along the insti-
tutional dimensions deﬁned in table 10? We suggest that the momentum
of institutional reform is likely to continue, for three interrelated reasons.
The ﬁrst is based on China’s record of institutional reform over the past
twenty-ﬁve years, during which the political leadership has continuously
engaged in the institutional reforms needed to sustain economic growth.
30
The historical record strongly suggests that China’s political leadership
is deeply vested in the reform process and will continue along the path
of institutional change. The second reason is the set of prior commit-
ments that frame Chinese law and the nation’s political choices. Notable
among these precommitments are China’s membership in the World Bank
and the International Monetary Fund and its accession to the WTO and
the TRIPS agreement, which together require minimum standards with
respect to openness, financial system reform, and enforcement of intel-
lectual property rights.
The third reason why substantial institutional reform is likely to con-
tinue is that China’s fast-emerging middle class and its growing force of
entrepreneurs, who are now eligible to become Communist Party mem-
bers, expect their political system and leaders to pursue policies that
support sustained economic growth. Robert Barro finds support for the
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29. Overseas funded enterprises are those with investment from residents of Hong Kong,
Taiwan, or Macao. Firms with investment from residents of any other jurisdiction are called
foreign-funded enterprises.
30. Jefferson and Rawski (1994) and Qian (2000), among others, focus on the under-
lying structural conditions that have driven China’s reform process.
10269-01_Jefferson-rev.qxd  1/29/07  10:56 AM  Page 43notion that political reform is endogenously driven by economic variables.31
Using panel data from over 100 countries from 1960 to 1995, Barro con-
cludes that the propensity for democracy is most robustly associated with
a growing middle-class share of GDP, with years of primary schooling
and a narrowing of the gap between male and female primary schooling,
and with the absence of oil as an abundant natural resource. With China
now enjoying the rapid growth of a middle class, with more females than
males in primary school, and with a growing dependence on imported oil,
China would seem to fit Barro’s profile of a country that is on the thresh-
old of important democratic innovations.
Our view is that although China has clearly not established an effec-
tive system of competitive political parties, the Communist Party’s mono-
poly over political power has evolved from one that is near absolute to
one that is, arguably at least, contestable.
32 To the extent the Party’s
power is a contestable monopoly, and given that its legitimacy and its
ability to resist those elements that might challenge its authority rest
squarely on China’s ability to sustain rising living standards and social
stability, the Party’s economic policy priorities and policy initiatives are
likely to continue, however haltingly, to be responsive to demands for
social and political reform.
According to one report, “Chinese ofﬁcials believe they need between
7% and 8% of their 10% growth rate simply to ensure domestic stability
through providing jobs for the wave of migrants coming to booming cities
. . . and services to restive rural communities.”
33 The list of institutional
reforms needed to sustain productivity growth in China (table 10) and 
the list of reforms needed to buttress the Party’s political legitimacy—
speciﬁcally, the need to sustain rising economic prosperity and social
order—are highly overlapping and interdependent. The experience of
China’s economic, institutional, and political reform process over the past
two decades suggests a high likelihood that, through a series of challenges
and responses and the learning associated with the reform process, facili-
tated by China’s unusual openness to the ﬂow of trade and ideas from the
OECD countries, China’s leadership will continue to advance institutional
44 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2006
31. Barro (1999).
32. These include Pei (1998) and Goldman (2005).
33. Frederick Kempe, “Thinking Global: Departing Zoellick Looks Back on Pending
Business with China,” Wall Street Journal, June 27, 2006, p. A10.
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ing the sources of productivity advance.
34
This optimistic projection tries not to disregard the magnitude of a
variety of serious challenges to China’s economic and political systems
no matter how able and responsive the country’s political leadership.
China’s sustained high rate of growth carries with it serious negative
spillovers. Among those that have been well documented both in acade-
mic studies and in the popular press are growing income inequality,
environmental degradation, risk and insecurity associated with a frag-
mented social insurance system, and corruption associated with ill-deﬁned
and poorly enforced property rights. Such developments confront China’s
leadership with difficult tradeoffs that increase the risk of derailing the
nation’s economic progress. Moreover, failure to curtail the negative
spillovers from rapid growth may undermine the legitimacy of the politi-
cal system and its ability to pursue the institutional reforms needed to
continue China’s catch-up with the international technology frontier and
the reductions in internal productivity gaps, both of which are needed to
sustain overall growth and rising living standards. Although the system
faces real threats, China’s accomplishments at reform to date, combined
with an emerging middle and entrepreneurial class that is rapidly accumu-
lating the education and experience in a competitive international environ-
ment, provide reassuring evidence that China is creating the civic capital
needed to respond effectively to the challenges and opportunities associ-
ated with its ongoing economic transformation.
Implications and Conclusions
We view China’s economic advance as a process of reducing, in a more
or less balanced way, several key productivity gaps. We ﬁnd evidence that
the pace of productivity catch-up varies substantially across these gaps.
China’s industrial economy is enjoying a rapid pace of catch-up with the
world’s industrial frontier. We further ﬁnd large and growing differences
in productivity between coastal industry and agriculture across China’s
regions. Productivity differences between coastal industry and the services
sector in the four regions are not as great as those between industry and
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assessments of the reforms needed to sustain China’s economic growth.
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ofﬁcial Chinese data are likely to overstate the size and rate of increase of
regional and sector productivity differences, our revised employment data
also show large differences and a continuing spread in productivity gaps.
Within China’s industrial sector, we ﬁnd evidence that the three noncoastal
regions are making progress in closing the productivity gap with coastal
industry. However, our analysis indicates that, at least in the medium term,
manufacturing in the coastal region will maintain an insurmountable pro-
ductivity lead over industry in China’s other regions. Outside of industry,
there is no evidence of a convergence of productivity across regions and
sectors.
A key ﬁnding of this paper is that the main productivity gaps—the inter-
national gap, the gaps across regions within the industrial economy, and
the industry-agriculture and industry-services gaps—all exhibit diminish-
ing contributions to productivity growth as the gaps narrow. As these gaps
further diminish, it is very probable that China’s productivity growth, par-
ticularly along the coast where catch-up with the international frontier is
occurring most rapidly, will slow.
It is instructive to compare China’s current pattern of productivity
gaps with those exhibited by South Korea and Taiwan when their GDP
per capita reached one quarter that of the United States, a milestone
China will achieve when its GDP reaches that of the United States. When
South Korea and Taiwan reached this milestone, their industrial labor
productivity was just one third the U.S. level. Since China’s income per
capita is presently only one twenty-fourth of the U.S. level, China’s
labor productivity will have to rise sixfold before it achieves a GDP per
capita that is one quarter that of the United States. However, given that
the industrial productivity of China’s coastal region today is nearly one
quarter that of the United States, an across-the-board sixfold scaling up
of Chinese productivity would require coastal industrial productivity to
reach an unattainable level of close to one and a half times that of the
United States.
Clearly, as the industrial productivity of China’s coastal region
approaches that of the international frontier, China’s GDP growth can
be expected to slow sharply, and China will need to rely less on coastal
industry as its engine of growth than it now does. This will require poli-
cies that more effectively integrate China’s internal economy, to reduce
the productivity gaps that now exist across its regions and sectors. Viewed
46 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2006
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United States, China’s economy will have to begin moving down the
right-hand side of Simon Kuznets’ inverted U-curve, reducing dispari-
ties in productivity and income across regions, sectors, and households.
Today, compared with South Korea and Taiwan, China leans more
heavily on its coastal industrial economy for overall catch-up. This dispro-
portionate reliance on international catch-up, even as large productivity
gaps and unrealized productivity and GDP growth potential persist within
the Chinese economy, will become an increasingly serious impediment to
China’s development. Continued institutional reform and policy initiatives
that shift the emphasis of China’s rapid growth from the coastal industrial
economy to the economic integration of its internal regions and backward
sectors should be a top priority.
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Discussion
Barry P. Bosworth: In this paper, Gary Jefferson, Albert Hu, and Jian Su
discuss a wide range of issues that arise in evaluations of China’s recent
growth performance and future prospects. Indeed, the range is so broad
that no one of these issues can be thoroughly examined within the context
of a single paper. I will therefore focus on just a few. 
The ﬁrst part of the paper examines China’s development on two mar-
gins: the labor productivity gap between China’s coastal region and a
global frontier, represented by a combination of manufacturing industries
in Japan and the United States; and the relative labor productivity gaps
among China’s four major regions. With respect to the ﬁrst issue, the
authors’ basic conclusion is that there has been considerable catch-up to
the international frontier, but the gap is still very large. No one should
quarrel with this conclusion, since China’s economy has obviously been
growing far more rapidly than the rest of the world. More controversially,
the authors ﬁnd that regional disparities in manufacturing productivity
within China narrowed between 1995 and 2002, except for the northeast
(table 2), where the gap with the leading coastal region has widened.
The comparisons are based on twenty-seven industries within manufac-
turing. International comparisons of levels of productivity at the individual
industry level are extraordinarily difﬁcult, especially for China, which has
only recently agreed to participate in the World Bank–led International
Comparison Program and still lacks comprehensive purchasing-power-
parity estimates of GDP. Most international comparisons are limited to
aggregate GDP, because the methodology needed to compute industry-
speciﬁc conversion factors is very underdeveloped. An estimate of the pur-
chasing-power-parity exchange rate has been cobbled together for China,
48
10269-01b_Jefferson Comments.qxd  1/29/07  10:56 AM  Page 48but its manufacturing industries reﬂect a mixture of exporters, for which
the commercial exchange rate would be applicable, and ﬁrms that produce
for the domestic market. Furthermore, at even the most detailed classiﬁca-
tion grouping, ﬁrms produce very different products in China, Japan, and
the United States. Thus, the international comparisons of productivity in
the authors’ table 2 and ﬁgure 1 should be handled with care. Within
China, the labor market and the transportation system are not integrated
across regions. This makes it hard to compare levels of value added per
worker across regions, since wages for equivalently skilled labor may dif-
fer. However, their relative growth rates should still reﬂect any conver-
gence that has occurred.
In tables 3 and 4 the authors shift to a data set that reports on both
national and regional economic performance at a broad sectoral level: agri-
culture, industry, and services. Here another data issue emerges: the
authors argue that, in recent years, as many as 80 million workers nation-
wide may have been misreported in the 2005 household surveys as work-
ing in agriculture when they are actually employed in industry or services.
Such misclassiﬁcations could dramatically affect our understanding of the
relative performance of Chinese agriculture and industry. The issue has
been raised in several earlier papers, but the extent of the miscounting
remains contentious. The authors deal with the problem by assuming that
the misclassiﬁcation of workers between agriculture and industry is uni-
form across regions, implying no effect on the regional comparisons of
productivity performance presented in table 4. This is not very helpful. 
The results of this broad sectoral analysis appear to conﬂict with the
authors’ earlier conclusions based on manufacturing data, since the north-
east now stands out with gains in labor productivity in industry between
1995 and 2004 that raise it above that of the coastal region. The industrial
sector does include some important nonmanufacturing industries, where
productivity growth may have been unusually rapid, and these industries
are largely concentrated in the northeast. Even so, can it be that the
region’s industrial labor productivity grew at an 18 percent annual rate?
The northeast also made signiﬁcant gains on the coastal region in services.
The other regions show modest convergence in industry and a mixed
record in agriculture and services.
Most of the subsequent analysis is based on an intriguing micro panel
data set of more than 20,000 large and medium-size enterprises. It might
have been preferable to focus the paper entirely on a more thorough analy-
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to include the role of capital and the computation of total factor productiv-
ity (TFP) at the level of individual ﬁrms. We are given no details on how
their measure of capital services is constructed, but their estimate of TFP is
based on a Cobb-Douglas production function with weights of 0.36 for the
capital input and 0.64 for labor. 
Initially, the authors focus on the interregional comparisons. They com-
pute productivity at the ﬁrm level and examine the cross-regional differ-
ences in levels for 1995 and 2004 by regressing the ﬁrm-level data on
productivity on a set of four regional categorical variables and controls for
industry effects (tables 5 and 6). Here the basic story is again one of sub-
stantial regional convergence of both labor productivity and TFP over the
period, and the northeast, the least efﬁcient region in 1995, is shown as
achieving the greatest catch-up. I would have thought that useful distinc-
tions could have been made between large and small ﬁrms and between
public and private ﬁrms. Later in the paper (ﬁgure 8), it becomes clear that
the authors do have information on enterprise ownership characteristics.
The low R
2s indicate that there is much unexplained variation across these
ﬁrms. Why were not some of these other potential determinants of produc-
tivity included? 
In table 7 the authors aggregate their data to the level of twenty-seven
industries and thirty-one provinces and relate the change in productivity
between 1995 and 2002 to the initial gap relative to the international fron-
tier. I do not know how they computed the efﬁciency gap, or how they
aggregated the ﬁrm data, but they again demonstrate substantial catch-up.
It is interesting that they obtain signiﬁcant evidence that the industries
that lag furthest behind show the greatest degree of catch-up, but the
response of the coastal region is signiﬁcantly greater than the all-China
average. The ﬁnding of a stronger response in the coastal region is sur-
prising in view of their earlier conclusion that the other regions were
growing more rapidly. However, in this set of estimates they do not
include regional variables. Furthermore, industries that show rapid pro-
ductivity growth at the international frontier grow more slowly within
China. The authors’ conjecture that industries experiencing rapid produc-
tivity change offer less opportunity for catch-up is not convincing.
The micro panel data set contains annual information for the period
1995–2004 and is able to distinguish among new entrants, preexisting ﬁrms
that survive the entire period, and ﬁrms that exit during the period. Differ-
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exiting ﬁrms are the focus of the analysis reported in tables 8 and 9. The
stated purpose is to determine the inﬂuence of ﬁrm turnover and the
implied reallocation of resources on overall productivity growth. Given the
emphasis on productivity levels in previous sections, I expected to see
more discussion of the variation across ﬁrms (controlling for industry) and
some measure of whether it declined during the ten-year period.
1
However, the authors instead focus on the estimation of simple factor
demand equations that relate the change in a factor input to the level of its
own marginal product at the beginning of the period (table 8). They mea-
sure marginal productivities as being proportionate to the average produc-
tivities. They restrict the sample to ﬁrms that have survived over the full
period, and they estimate the factor demand equations for two subperiods.
The coefﬁcients on the initial factor productivity level are positive for both
the change in labor and the change in capital, but the effort to relate the
growth in value added to the initial level of TFP results in a negative coefﬁ-
cient. Similarly, the change in TFP is negatively related to its initial level.
The authors argue that the unexpected negative coefﬁcient is consistent
with catch-up by the low-productivity ﬁrms. However, it might also be
interpreted as showing the inadequacy of the underlying model, since one
is left with the inference that high-productivity ﬁrms increase their use of
labor and capital but reduce their output. The analysis is expanded in table
9 to include exiting and entering ﬁrms, but the data for such ﬁrms appear
only in the year in which their status changed. That is, entering ﬁrms are
those that were present in period t, but not period t – 1, and exiting ﬁrms
are those present in period t but not period t + 1. This would seem to be a
very restrictive deﬁnition for many reasons, and it would seem a much bet-
ter approach to examine the performance of entering and exiting ﬁrms for
years other than the transition year. 
Exiting ﬁrms turn out always to be the worst performers, and new ﬁrms
have faster TFP growth than surviving ﬁrms in all three periods, and faster
growth in labor productivity except in 2002–04. These results are as one
would expect, but we are provided with no estimate of the contribution of
ﬁrm births and deaths to the overall growth of productivity either at the
Gary H. Jefferson, Albert G. Z. Hu, and Jian Su 51
1. Hsieh and Klenow (2006) used a similar data set to highlight the wide variations in
productivity of Chinese ﬁrms and the potential contribution that reductions in this dispersion
could make to overall productivity growth.
10269-01b_Jefferson Comments.qxd  1/29/07  10:56 AM  Page 51level of an industry or for the full sample. We are told that both entrances
and exits were frequent, and that the number of entrants and exits was
roughly equal, but we know nothing of their size.
Finally, what the authors call capital productivity is simply the output-
capital ratio. I was surprised to observe in ﬁgure 5 that the growth of out-
put exceeded that of the capital stock in this data set and that the
output-capital ratio rose substantially after 1997, despite the incredible
rates of investment that China has sustained over the past decade.
The remainder of the paper addresses some issues concerning the sus-
tainability of China’s growth. Much of that discussion seems to be drawn
from an earlier paper by one of the authors that addresses R&D and patent-
ing behavior in China. However, given the large remaining productivity
gaps demonstrated between Chinese ﬁrms and their international competi-
tors, China should be able to sustain its growth for many years through
technological catch-up, without the need to focus on new innovations.
Gustav Ranis: This paper is laudable in its aims, ambitious in its scope,
and prodigious in the energy expended on it, but somewhat disappointing
in its execution. Its objective, to parse out the sources of China’s astonish-
ing past growth and its prospects for the future, is unexceptionable. China
has made a dramatic recent entry onto the international scene, economi-
cally and politically as well as strategically. Consequently, there is a lot of
discussion, in the professional economics literature as well as among pol-
icy experts, concerning the sources of that performance and, even more,
concerning the system’s prognosis, because China is now seen as a major
player, whether as a brand new locomotive for the global economy or as a
brand new threat to the established international economic order.
Gary Jefferson, Albert Hu, and Jian Su have chosen to analyze China’s
past and future by examining the extent of catch-up, both of China’s inte-
rior toward its coastal, externally oriented, provinces, and of the latter
toward the international technology frontier represented by either the
United States or Japan, depending on the industry. At times, the authors
refer to multiple gaps, between regional agriculture and coastal industry,
between regional services and coastal industry, between interior industry
and coastal industry, and between coastal industry and the international
frontier. However, they frame their analysis, in what they call the “basic
model,” in terms of only two gaps, international and internal, and this is a
source of some confusion.
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the catch-up of China’s coastal industries toward the international frontier.
Since the coastal provinces are the most economically advanced, interna-
tional convergence is not likely to be very pronounced, but, so the argu-
ment goes, they give rise to externalities such as technical diffusion that
narrow the internal gaps and help to sustain over time the impact of the
coast’s gradual convergence with the frontier.
I have a basic problem with any deﬁnition of technological catch-up that
is expressed in terms of labor productivity differentials. For example, the
authors ﬁnd that industrial labor productivity in 2002 in China’s advanced
coastal provinces was less than a quarter that in the United States or Japan.
Deﬁning technology gaps in this fashion is highly questionable, since one
would expect rich countries to exhibit much higher industrial capital-labor
ratios, and therefore higher labor productivity. The much preferred measure
would seem to be differences in total factor productivity (TFP), indepen-
dent of the extent of capital deepening. Simply substituting labor productiv-
ity for TFP requires some rather heroic assumptions concerning the
constancy of relative income shares or factor price equalization.
Indeed, in all their treatment of productivity gaps, the authors appeal to
factor reallocation, presumably with technology ﬁxed, as a source of TFP
growth. In their analysis they calculate the marginal productivity of labor
as proportional to average labor productivity. If they were truly dealing
with the marginal rather than the average productivity of labor, the
authors’ argument that aggregate TFP can be enhanced, even in the
unlikely absence of any technical change, simply by reallocating labor in
ways that eliminate existing gaps in marginal product, would make sense.
But this is not what the authors have in mind. Estimates of TFP that
exclude the contribution of innovation and rely entirely on reallocation are
not realistic even in the case of the interaction between domestic agricul-
tural and nonagricultural production (see below), and they are certainly
inconsistent with the authors’ emphasis on FDI, R&D, and patents when
dealing with the catch-up of China’s coastal industries to the international
frontier. As their borrowed table 1 powerfully illustrates, factor realloca-
tion represents only one, and by no means the dominant, component of the
TFP residual in virtually all countries.
In their empirical analysis, the authors deal in turn with each of several
of the gaps they have suggested as relevant. With respect to the interna-
tional gap, they address two important issues: Has the existence initially of
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And does the resulting reduction of that gap over time imply a decline in
China’s future industrial productivity growth? The authors ﬁnd that the
larger the gap, the larger the catch-up in all of China’s regions. But they
also ﬁnd that China’s coastal industry enjoys higher rates of productivity
growth than the more backward regions, which runs counter to the conven-
tional convergence story. To explain this, the authors go outside their
model, invoking higher concentrations of FDI and R&D as well as certain
locational and industrial agglomeration advantages in the coastal region.
But these are the very factors that directly determine endogenous TFP
rather than labor productivity.
The authors ﬁnd, using data for twenty-seven Chinese industries and
thirty-one provinces, that China’s industrial labor productivity has con-
verged toward the international frontier in recent years. For example, labor
productivity in the coastal region moved from one ninth of the international
frontier in 1995 to one fourth in 2002, “demonstrating the degree of catch-
up.” However, as already pointed out, this result is likely due in large part to
the more rapid pace of capital accumulation in China than in the United
States or even Japan: investment in China has exceeded 40 percent of GDP
in recent years. Even if we accept the authors’ deﬁnition of catch-up and
focus on the coastal region primarily (as in the top panel of their ﬁgure 1), it
would have been helpful to examine why, as they note, the food, beverage,
and tobacco industry stands out, in having labor productivity that is ten
times that of industry as a whole. Is that because of an unusually high 
capital-labor ratio in that industry, or because of an unusually high rate of
proﬁts caused by government-imposed barriers to entry, as they claim?
The authors next discuss a variety of internal productivity gaps:
between agriculture and domestic industry, between industry and services,
and across regions within the services and industrial sectors, but, confus-
ingly, they claim to empirically examine only two of these. Comparing
domestic agriculture and industry, they ﬁnd (table 3) that the ratio of
industrial to agricultural labor productivity rose from 6.1 in 1980 to 7.1 in
2005, after initially declining with the shift from communes to the respon-
sibility system in agriculture. However, with agricultural labor presumably
largely unskilled, any comparison with “average industrial workers” rather
than exclusively with reallocated unskilled industrial workers (for exam-
ple, in construction or textiles) makes very little sense. In addition, I have
a problem with the authors’ reallocation effect, which is related mainly to
54 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2006
10269-01b_Jefferson Comments.qxd  1/29/07  10:56 AM  Page 54the size of the productivity gap g and the fraction β of labor in the low-
productivity agricultural sector (see their equation 2 and figure 4). The
authors neglect the possibility of technological change in agriculture, which
historically almost inevitably accompanies the labor reallocation process.
Moreover, I fail to see why the fraction of the population in agriculture
should affect the annual rate of reallocation. After all, that rate depends less
on how many workers are available for transfer in any one year than on
their ability to move and be absorbed by higher-productivity nonagricul-
tural activities. This is not to dispute the point that the bargains for GDP
growth arising from labor reallocation in a dualistic economy are likely to
diminish over time as the agricultural labor surplus itself diminishes.
The conceptual and empirical core of the paper, dealing with the internal
productivity gaps across nonagricultural sectors, is presumably to be found
in the implementation of their equations 3 to 6. However, the relevance for
gap reduction of equations 3 and 4, which indicate how initial marginal fac-
tor productivities yield changes in the subsequent demand for labor and
capital, is not at all clear to me. Equations 5 and 6, which do bring in TFP,
bear a family resemblance to the Solow equation, even though the rates of
growth of both labor and capital inputs are not included, and even though
we know TFP in that context to be an exogenous residual. It is also here
where the later discussion of FDI, R&D, and patenting could have been
introduced to provide explicit endogenous behavioral elements.
The authors follow this discussion with a very interesting and novel
analysis, based on rare primary data, of the contribution of the turnover
(exit and entry) of ﬁrms to labor productivity change, by comparing these
ﬁrms with those that survive over the same 1995–2004 period. Not surpris-
ingly, exiting ﬁrms nearly always exhibit substantially lower, and entering
ﬁrms substantially higher, productivity than survivor ﬁrms. Later on, the
authors interestingly identify many of the exiting ﬁrms as state enterprises
and many of the entrants as restructured or greenﬁeld private enterprises.
Two questions arise, however: First, is it reasonable to believe that out of a
total annual population of 22,000 to 27,000 ﬁrms, more than 16,000
(146,000 ÷ 9) either entered or exited each year from 1996 to 2004? More-
over, as the authors admit, the number of ﬁrms gives no indication of the
relative size of the three categories under discussion.
A potentially more serious issue arises with respect to the NBS panel
used for the analysis that includes only large and medium-size enterprises.
As Jian Gao and Jefferson acknowledge elsewhere, “the vast majority of
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prises.”
1 This must be especially true for the township and village enter-
prise sector and the rapidly growing private enterprise sector over the most
recent decade. The exclusion of these ﬁrms from the analysis must cast
considerable doubt on the ﬁndings. 
Finally, in their discussion of the sustainability of China’s productivity
growth, the authors return to deﬁning technical progress in terms of labor
productivity. I agree that there continue to exist large opportunities to re-
allocate labor from agriculture to other sectors, and undoubtedly these are
best expressed in terms of technological and institutional changes. There
follows a section on “China’s Science and Technology Takeoff,” which
seems to ask what changes in R&D or in patenting have caused the changes
in China’s industrial TFP. The authors accept the empirical regularity of a
“science and technology takeoff” when R&D reaches 1 percent of GDP, and
they provide some interesting and generally plausible arguments as to why,
with the help of R&D and FDI inﬂows, China has already reached this point.
Here again, however, the published R&D ﬁgures, which focus entirely
on the ofﬁcial reports of large and medium-size ﬁrms, public and private,
do not really convey a credible indication of a country’s true R&D activity.
For example, in the other East Asian economies cited in the paper, the kind
of informal blue-collar R&D that takes place on the factory ﬂoor and in the
repair shop has been shown to be extremely important in generating the
adaptive technical changes that are often less than spectacular individually,
but massive, and usually labor-absorbing, in the aggregate.
2 The ensuing
discussion of patents indicates not only that FDI-related foreign patents
played a major role in stimulating domestic invention patents, but indeed
that these were dwarfed by the explosion of relatively low-inventiveness-
threshold utility patents, presumably heavily concentrated in smaller ﬁrms.
My educated guess would be that these utility models, in China as earlier
in the case of Japan, amount to more than simple imitations (or reverse
engineering); rather, they also represent individually modest but, in toto,
massive adaptive changes in both the process and product quality dimen-
sions. Unfortunately, the paper’s interesting discussion of R&D, FDI, and
patenting intensity is not at all integrated with the rest of the paper. It is, of
course, no surprise that these variables are generally weighted more heav-
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various gaps and China’s overall growth trajectory is not really demon-
strated. And again, they could be modeled as contributing directly to TFP,
not to the various factor productivities.
Finally, although I applaud the authors’ effort, at the end of the paper, to
include some important political economy and institutional dimensions,
that discussion is necessarily ex cathedra. I ﬁnd myself in full agreement
with much of their argument—that to sustain its growth China needs to take
into account such constraints as a worsening income distribution, environ-
mental degradation, uncertain property rights (especially in agriculture),
corruption, and lagging political reforms, and that even under optimistic
assumptions about continued institutional reforms (and the authors are
clearly optimistic), the shrinkage of China’s various productivity gaps,
especially the international one, is likely to mean smaller contributions to
overall growth in the future. After all, what successful middle-income
developing country has been able to maintain real growth rates in the 8 to
10 percent range as it approaches economic maturity? 
General discussion: William Nordhaus complimented the authors on their
analysis of Chinese ﬁrms’ productivity, which provided valuable insights
into the sources of China’s remarkable growth. But he also expressed reser-
vations about some of the more aggregate results. Because much of the
underlying data are constructed using Laspeyres indexes, estimates of pro-
ductivity growth in the Chinese economy and its various sectors are biased
upward. Edward Denison showed long ago that the increase in productivity
that results from moving labor from low-productivity to high-productivity
sectors largely disappears when the more appropriate chain-weighted quan-
tity indexes are used. This increase in measured productivity, or “Denison
effect,” can be quite large, accounting for over 1 percentage point of re-
ported productivity growth in Italy from 1952 to 1960, for example. Nord-
haus noted that the Chinese national accounts use Laspeyres indexes with
1990 planning prices; he expected that a substantial fraction of productivity
growth, perhaps on the order of two-thirds of a percentage point, would dis-
appear once the Chinese move to chain-weighted indexes.
Nordhaus also pointed out that the output indexes used by the authors
need to take into account differences in price levels across regions and
ﬁrms. It is not clear what methodology Chinese ofﬁcials follow to deal
with this issue, and no method is completely satisfactory. For example, the
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be matched by outlet, has difﬁculty dealing with such differences. 
Nordhaus remarked that cross-country comparisons of the level of pro-
ductivity, and by implication estimates of the rate of convergence, are even
more problematic than within-country comparisons. The authors do not
attempt to adjust for the difference between purchasing-power-parity
(PPP) and market exchange rates. In the case of China, it seems likely that
using the market exchange rate underestimates productivity and overesti-
mates the gap between China and the industrial frontier, especially for
industries that produce mostly nontradables. A further difﬁculty in the
level comparisons is that domestically supplied inputs, such as structures,
are likely to be undervalued. Nordhaus noted, however, that the available
PPP data for China are far out of date: the Penn World Tables base their
PPP estimates on Irving Kravis’s data from 1975, with some updates,
including from a bilateral city comparison from 1993 between Hong Kong
and Guangdong; a scheduled ten-city study is still pending. Without more
recent data, reliable PPP adjustments are not feasible.
David Backus thought it would be interesting to decompose productiv-
ity growth in Chinese industry into components that capture changes due
to ﬁrm entry, and components that capture exit changes in surviving ﬁrms.
He mentioned studies by Jan de Loecker and James Schmitz, Jr., that
looked at productivity changes following transitions that made the envi-
ronment more competitive. Both these authors found not only that some of
the least productive ﬁrms exited, but also that relatively unproductive ﬁrms
became more productive. Backus wondered whether changes in regula-
tions in China had had similar effects and had resulted in less dispersion in
productivity at the industry level. Also, given the large dispersion in ﬁrm
productivity within industries, it would be interesting to know whether the
low-productivity ﬁrms in the present authors’ sample also have bank ties
of the kind explored by Wendy Dobson and Anil Kashyap in their paper in
this volume.
Wendy Dobson wondered whether the Chinese authorities are today
actually devoting resources to the creation of new knowledge, or if they
are still primarily preoccupied with catching up with the existing stock of
knowledge. Gary Jefferson replied that his impression was that the Chi-
nese authorities’ intention is to put more emphasis on creation of new
knowledge. Indeed, from the patent data it seemed that the ﬁrms them-
selves are focusing more on invention than they have in the past. 
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